Entwistle describes how each culture demands its own dress, whether clothing, tattooing, body art or cosmetics – these conventions transform the flesh into something palatable to society, pushing the body into a semantic discourse it is otherwise is absent from. For Entwistle, dress does not merely cover modesty or reflect the natural body but it is crucial to the microsocial order. (from ‘abstract’ of article)
Conventions of dress transform flesh into something recognizable and meaningful to a culture and are also the means by which bodies are made “decent,” appropriate and acceptable within specific contexts. Dress does not merely serve to protect our modesty and does not simply reflect a natural body or, for that matter, a given identity; it embellishes the body, the materials commonly used adding a whole array of meanings to the body that would otherwise not be there.
I sketch out a theoretical framework that takes as its starting-point the idea that dress is an embodied practice, a situated bodily practice that is embedded within the social world and fundamental to microsocial order (Entwistle 2000a). While emphasizing the social nature of dress, this framework also asserts the idea that individuals/subjects are active in their engagement with the social and that dress is thus actively produced through routine practices directed towards the body. In order to capture this sense of dress as both socially structured and embodied and practical, I shall draw on a wide range of theoretical resources.
The main discussion will focus on the uses and limitations of both the structuralist and post-structuralist approaches, since these have been influential in recent years in the sociological study of the body. In part- icular, the work of Mary Douglas (1973, 1984), Marcel Mauss (1973) and Michel Foucault (1977, 1986) offers fruitful insights into the way in which the body is rendered meaningful by culture. However, such approaches are limited when it comes to acknowledging the “fleshy” body and its experiential dimensions. They also neglect to account for how structures and rules result in actual embodied practices, sometimes with the effect of reducing individuals to puppet-like actors. In contrast, the phenomenology of Maurice Merleau-Ponty (1976, 1981), which begins with the idea of the body as the “existential ground of culture” (Csordas 1993), is suggestive of the ways in which dress can be understood as an embodied practice. These theoretical traditions may seem at odds with one another; and indeed, according to Crossley (1996), they have been considered incommensurable by some. However, as he argues, they offer different and complementary insights into the body and embodiment in society. Following Crossley (1995a, 1995b, 1996) and also Csordas (1993, 1996), I shall argue that an account of dress as a situated bodily practice can draw on the insights of these two different traditions, struc- turalism and phenomenology, and indeed must do so. Dress as both a social and a personal experience is a discursive and practical phenomenon